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Abstract
Researchers often face the problem of needing to protect the privacy of subjects while also needing to integrate data that
contains personal information from diverse data sources. The advent of computational social science and the enormous
amount of data about people that is being collected makes protecting the privacy of research subjects ever more
important. However, strict privacy procedures can hinder the process of joining diverse sources of data that contain
information about specific individual behaviors. In this paper we present a procedure to keep information about specific
individuals from being ‘‘leaked’’ or shared in either direction between two sources of data without need of a trusted third
party. To achieve this goal, we randomly assign individuals to anonymous groups before combining the anonymized
information between the two sources of data. We refer to this method as the Yahtzee procedure, and show that it performs
as predicted by theoretical analysis when we apply it to data from Facebook and public voter records.
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To address these issues we have developed a method to
anonymously match group level information. This method is
different from other ‘‘privacy preserving’’ machine learning
techniques, in that our process joins distinct information about
individuals from at least two sources [8] whereas ‘‘privacy
preserving’’ machine learning techniques pool similar data from
multiple sources. The ‘‘Yahtzee’’ procedure also does not rely on a
third party function to join the constituent datasets as some other
procedures do [9]. A review of other computational methods for
ensuring case level anonymity can be found elsewhere [10]. The
advantage of the ‘‘Yahtzee’’ procedure is that no party ever needs
to know certain information about a specific individual because
this information is anonymized prior to merging the constituent
datasets. The Yahtzee procedure can therefore be used to
preprocess a dataset before it is ever sent to another organization
for analysis. Thus, multiple data collecting entities can use this
procedure to anonymize their data before combining that data
with other sources for joint analysis.
We developed this method in order to join information from
public voting records with data we are analyzing through a
collaborative research project with Facebook [11]. Although our
human subjects protocol approved by the Institutional Review
Board at the University of California, San Diego, allows us to
perform one-to-one matching of Facebook data and voter records,
Facebook asked us to design a procedure that would better protect
the privacy of its users. Thus, in order to study the voting behavior

Introduction
Computational social science is an emergent field of inquiry that
promises to revolutionize the way we study and understand human
behavior [1,2]. Unfortunately, obstacles exist that hamper analysis
of the large-scale dynamic datasets that are now available [2]. One
problem is that companies (such as Google, Facebook, or cell
phone providers, for example) are often reluctant to share with
external researchers data obtained from their clients. When they
do allow access to the data, it is often in an aggregated or
anonymized format designed to protect the identities of their users.
While this approach has led to a variety of collaborative research
projects [3], once identifying information is removed from the data
it cannot be combined with other data sources, limiting the type
and scope of research that can be performed with such data.
This article presents a procedure designed to address this issue
by keeping information about specific individuals private while still
allowing researchers to combine multiple sources of information in
such a way that they can still make inferences about the
relationships between variables across sets of data. In this way,
the method developed in this paper ensures anonymity ex post by
adding uncertainty about an individual’s response after data
collection through a group-level matching procedure. The method
is conceptually similar but procedurally distinct from other
techniques designed to ensure respondent anonymity a priori at
the time of data collection [4–7].
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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of users, it was necessary to devise a process for matching users to
their publicly available voting records without identifying the
behavior of specific users. In this process, we wanted to be sure
that information about specific individuals was not ‘‘leaked’’ or
shared in either direction. Our goal was to avoid connecting any
specific Facebook user’s voting behavior to Facebook’s database of
information about a given user. To achieve this goal, we devised a
group-level matching procedure that repeatedly randomly assigned users to groups, allowing us to know a user’s turnout
decision with a given probability, as we describe below. The
procedure ensures that the group level value never implicates an
individual in either dataset. This would only be possible if both
datasets were exactly the same.
In the next section of this article we describe the method and
then follow this with a discussion of our application that links
publicly available voter records with Facebook data. We then
validate the method and close with a discussion of the usefulness of
the method for computational social science research generally.

birth. In the first step of the procedure we produce a unique
identifier for each individual in each of the datasets we wish to
merge. To do so we take identifying information that is common
across those datasets (in our case, first name, last name, and date of
birth), concatenate them together and generate an encrypted oneway hash. The hash is a numeric hexadecimal value which we
modify to create a group ID.
When creating the user specific hexadecimal ID, it is also
necessary to use a different random number seed and a ‘‘salt.’’ A
salt is a character string that is added to the end of the unique
identifier in each round of the procedure. In each round the salt is
changed so that the hashing procedure produces a new, unique
hash for the given individual. The salt allows us to generate
multiple hashes per user without getting the same hash every
iteration of the process. This ensures that user information cannot
be unhashed given knowledge of individuals in a specific dataset.
An example dataset is displayed in Table 1 which demonstrates
the concatenation of identifying information and the ‘‘salt.’’ In our
application, we ‘‘salt’’ the concatenated values by adding 4
randomly generated characters to the end of each string prior to
using the hashing algorithm.
Next, the hash is divided by the value N=g, where N is the
number of individuals in the dataset and g is the size of the groups
that the researcher wishes to use. We have chosen to set g~5, but
this is an arbitrary decision that can be changed. Each individual,
i, is then assigned a group ID that is equal to the remainder of
hashi
.
(N=g)
We then place individuals into groups based on this ID. This
step generates groups of various sizes, but on average, groups will
be of size g. Sampling variation causes some groups to contain
more or fewer than g respondents; these groups should be
discarded because knowledge of the group size is necessary for
statistical inference later in the procedure. On average, though,
the groups should contain g records. It should be apparent as well
that smaller values of g lead to increased uncertainty about the
behavior rate of the group for each round of the procedure.
We record the frequency of the behavior of interest for each
group ID. In our application this behavior is voter turnout. We
also record the group ID.
Next, we generate a group ID using an identical process on the
second, destination dataset (Facebook data in our application). We
then ‘‘match’’ the two data sets based on the recorded group IDs
we create. A ‘‘match’’ is defined as a row in both files that has the
same group ID. Individuals who have the same starting values (in
the example above, the same name and birthdate) will have the
same hash value. Individuals with the same hash value will be
assigned to the same group.
In some cases, the same record exists in both datasets, and its
contribution to the value assigned to the group in the origin
dataset will be transferred to the group in the destination dataset.
However, we can never be sure if an individual in one of the
datasets is also in the other. We can therefore be sure that identical
records in both datasets will be assigned the same group ID but we
never know for which records this is the case.
Importantly, we can never be certain about the behavior of an
individual in either group because we are never certain if the
groups in the two datasets contain the same individuals. We know
only that if the same record is in both datasets it will be assigned
the same group ID but we can never be certain if the individuals in
the two groups are the same.
Moreover, because we never transfer individual-level data we
can never be certain about an individual-level value. Records in
the destination data are always assigned values, but we are

Materials and Methods
Group-Level Anonymous Matching
In this section of the paper we describe the Yahtzee method
generally and then apply it to datasets that contain voter
registration data, which we anonymously combine with Facebook
data. It is worth mentioning early and often that the method
ensures that only group-level data is passed from one dataset to the
other. Individual level data is never merged between datasets. This
is accomplished by following several steps that can be applied to
virtually any dataset.
Our goal was to match publicly available validated voting
records to the records of Facebook users, while protecting the
privacy of users’ information by not identifying the behavior of
individual users. In the United States, turnout behavior is a matter
of public record (note that ‘‘turnout’’ refers to whether an
individual voted, not how an individual voted). However, states
vary in how they keep these records and the procedures and costs
associated with accessing them. To choose which states to validate,
we identified those that provided (for research purposes) first
names, last names, and full birth dates in publicly available voting
records. From these, we chose a set that minimized the cost per
individual voting record. Of these states, the cost of voting records
varied from $0 to $1500 per state. We excluded records from
Texas because they systematically excluded some individuals from
their voting records (specifically, they did not report on the voting
behavior of people that had abstained in the four prior elections).
The resulting list of 13 states included Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. In
our application, the ‘‘origin’’ dataset was a state’s voter record file
and the ‘‘destination’’ dataset was the Facebook data.
We make a distinction between the origin and destination
dataset for ease of exposition but in practice the procedure is
conducted on both datasets and the group level information can be
shared by the holders of either of the original datasets. However,
to increase the match rate and statistical efficiency of the analysis,
the holder of the larger dataset should match groups generated
from the smaller dataset. We discuss this issue when describing the
overall match rate when we apply the method. In short, a higher
match rate is achieved by sending the group level data to the
holder of the larger dataset for analysis.
We begin by removing duplicate rows from the origin dataset
(state voter files in our application). In our case, these are
individuals who have the same first name, last name and date of
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Table 1. Hash Example.

first name

last name

date of birth

Salt

concatenated value to hash

last 7 hash
digits

1

Jason

Jones

11/07/1977

XKCD

JASONJONES19771107XKCD

b815d72

2

Robert

Bond

10/2/1983

XKCD

ROBERTBOND19831021XKCD

3863afe

3

Christopher

Fariss

11/18/1981

XKCD

CHRISTOPHERFARISS19811118XKCD

e0df6f8

4

Jaime

Settle

7/5/1985

XKCD

JAIMESETTLE19850705XKCD

c2e47b1

5

Adam

Kramer

1/24/1981

XKCD

ADAMKRAMER19810124XKCD

947407f

6

Cameron

Marlow

3/28/1977

XKCD

CAMERONMARLOW19770328XKCD

e4b91f9

7

James

Fowler

2/18/1970

XKCD

JAMESFOWLER19700218XKCD

46221bc

..
.

..
.

..
.

..
.

..
.

..
.

..
.

N
Example hash of first name, last name and date of birth. The last 7 digits of the SHA-256 hash value are kept and the rest of the hash discarded because of memory
limitations. The 7 digit hash is a numeric hexadecimal value. For step 1, each round of the Yahtzee procedure begins with the hashing of the datasets using a new salt.
The ‘‘salt’’ allows us to generate multiple hashes without getting the same hash every round. Next, the hash is divided by the value N=g, where N is the number of
individuals in the dataset and g~5 was chosen arbitrarily. The remainder of this calculation is recorded as the group ID. Records are then placed into groups of various
sizes based on this group ID. On average the groups should contain g records. Next the frequency of some behavior of interest - in our case voting - is recorded for each
group ID. In subsequent steps, a group ID is generated using the identical process on a second dataset. In the second dataset, the frequency of the behavior of interest
is assigned to each record based on its group ID. In some cases, the same record is in both datasets, and its contribution to the value assigned to the group in the origin
dataset will be transferred to the group in the destination dataset. However, individual records are never matched. We can be sure that identical records in both
datasets will be assigned the same group ID, but we can never be sure for any one record if a true match exists in the other dataset or just records that hash to values
with the same remainder after dividing by N=g.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055760.t001

birth_day, birth_month, birth_year. Again, duplicate rows in both
files are thrown out before any matching begins. Approximately
0.5% of Facebook users and approximately 0.5% of voters from
the voter files were dropped due to duplication.
We conducted the procedure on each of several voter
registration datasets. Facebook, as the holder of the larger dataset,
then hashed the user record data (with the same sequence of
random seeds and salts that we used), using first_name, last_name,
and birth_day, birth_month, birth_year (also dropping duplicates)
for users who logged in from the state in question on Election Day.
An issue arose because the Facebook data does not ask users to
explicitly name their first_name and last_name columns, but it
does have a name column that contains the name provided by the
user at time of registration. We defined first_name as the first
token in name and last_name as the last token in the ‘‘name’’ field.
This works well because most people enter their name such as
‘‘First M. Last’’. However, it does not work if the name is entered
as ‘‘The Illustrious First M. Last, Esquire,’’ which occasionally
happens online. This inconsistency between datasets actually
works to the advantage of those interested in the privacy
preserving features of the method since individuals with names
that do not follow the ‘‘First M. Last’’ are not matched and
therefore add noise to the estimated individual-level values.
Facebook then divided the hash value derived from each name
and birthdate by N=g in order to create a group ID (note that N
still represents the number of individuals from the origin dataset—
i.e., the individual public voter records— not the number of
individuals Facebook recorded as logging in from that state). This
procedure is identical to the procedure used to create group IDs
using public voting records. Therefore, individuals with the same
first name, last name, and date of birth in both the public voting
records and Facebook’s data were assigned the same group ID.
This procedure guaranteed that any and all Facebook users who
were also registered voters would be assigned the same group ID in
both sets of data. However, because there was no guarantee that a
given registered voter would also be a Facebook user, nor that a
given Facebook user would be registered to vote (and therefore in

uncertain whether those values are assigned due to a ‘‘match’’ or if
they are assigned due to a shared group ID without a true
‘‘match.’’ That is, we are never certain if individuals are in both
groups and the group-level matches therefore lead to the
assignment of values to individual level records that would not
otherwise be matched.
It is therefore worth repeating that the group level value never
implicates an individual in either dataset. This would only be
possible if both datasets were exactly the same, which would allow
us to be certain that the individuals in groups with the same ID
contained exactly the same individuals.
To make statistical inferences possible at an individual level,
repetition of the grouping procedure is conducted m times, rehashing using different seeds (and thus re-grouping individuals),
and assigning an additional value to each user after every round.
This repetition gave rise to our nickname for the procedure,
‘‘Yahtzee,’’ which refers to the idea of metaphorically re-rolling
the dice on each iteration to place users in new groups. Figure 1
displays this process graphically.
Each respondent is assigned a distribution of m values, from the
set y[f0,1, . . . ,gg. If gw1 then it is not possible to infer with
certainty the behavior of any individual user. However, given the
distribution of these values, each additional draw provides more
information about an individual’s behavior. It is therefore possible
to determine the m number of times the procedure should be
repeated such that enough observations per person are recorded to
classify an individual in the second dataset as behaving in a certain
way. We describe how to calculate the estimate of the individuallevel behavior in the next section and the number of m iterations
necessary as we apply the method to data.

Application of the Method
Recall that a ‘‘match’’ is defined as a row in both files that has
the same values across files for ALL of the following columns in
both the voter registration files (the origin dataset) and the
Facebook data (the destination dataset): first_name, last_name,
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Figure 1. Step 1 of the Yahtzee procedure begins with the hashing of the datasets using a new salt (See Table 1 above). In step 2 the
group ID is determined for all groups where g~5 in the origin dataset and then matched to the same group ID from the destination group-level
dataset. Notice that the hashing procedure and group aggregation is the same in both datsets except we keep all groups in the destination dataset,
regardless of size. This is so because we only need to know the group size from the origin dataset to make predictions about the behavior in the
destination dataset. Once the group-level datasets are matched by the group ID, the group-level information is stored and the process is repeated m
times. In step 3 the group level data is sent to the holder of the destination dataset so that the group level values can be assigned to the individual
observations based on the same hashes used in the construction of the groups during each of the Yahtzee rounds. Once the destination dataset has
acquired a sufficient number of group level values (see Figure 2 for information on determining the value of m) it is possible to then use the
combined information to predict the behavior of each individual, which is step 4 of the Yahtzee procedure. For our application, using equations 4, 5
and 6 above, it is possible to predict if the individual is unregistered, a voter or an abstainer. Finally, it is worth repeating that only the group-level
data is passed from the origin to the destination dataset. See the Pseudocode for additional information.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055760.g001

the voter record), this procedure prevented identification of a
specific Facebook user’s behavior. The proportion of truly
matched Facebook users in any group was unknown and could
range from 0% to 100%.

PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Using the state voting data, we calculated the number of
registered voters in each group who did vote (some number
between 0 and g) in 2010. We recorded that number and assigned
it to each Facebook user with the same group ID. Importantly, a
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Figure 2. The proportion of correct predictions for participation rates of 30%, 45%, 55%, and 70% (the match rate is held constant
at 30% in all four figures) from a simulation of the matching procedure. The dark line represents the accuracy rate for true participators. The
light line represents the accuracy rate for true abstainers. Accuracy increases for both categories as observations for each individual are obtained from
the Yahtzee procedure. Note that the less frequent of the two behaviors requires fewer observations for classification than the more frequent
behavior. m1 is the number of observations per person necessary to achieve a given level of accuracy for the less frequent behavior and m1 zm2 is
the number of observations necessary to achieve a given level of accuracy for the more frequent behavior.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055760.g002

draw provides more information and we can set m such that we have
enough observations per person to classify individuals on Facebook as
matched voters or matched abstainers with a minimum predetermined level of measurement error (we chose a value of 5%).
To see why, notice that Facebook users who were not registered
to vote would have an effectively random classification in every
round. They are also randomly assigned to groups that have a
random number of voters and abstainers in them. Therefore, if p is
equal to the turnout rate, then the probability that the jth draw for
user i is equal to y can be determined from a binomial distribution:

Facebook user was assigned to a group whether or not they were
on the registration list. The group may have had any number of
voters. So, in a given instance a user who was not on the
registration list may be assigned to a group in which any fraction of
those on the registration list voted. This feature of the procedure
ensures that we cannot be certain that a particular Facebook user
registered or voted based on the turnout value of their assigned
group.
After repeating the Yahtzee process, each user was assigned a
distribution of m values, from the set y[f0,1, . . . ,gg. Because gw1, it
is not possible to infer with certainty the voting behavior of any users, or
even their registration status. As we describe above, each additional

PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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g y
Pr(yij ~y)~
p (1{p)(g{y) :
y

voted, and vice versa. We therefore must make additional draws
for individuals classified as belonging to the more frequent group.
To achieve balanced rates we select two values: m1 is the number
of draws necessary to reach the desired level of accuracy for the
less frequent behavior and m2 is the number of additional draws
necessary to reach the desired level of accuracy for all individuals
classified with the more frequent behavior (after m1 draws).
Choosing m1 and m2 requires knowledge of the aggregate
turnout rate, which was computed directly from the voter record.
It also requires knowledge of the match rate (the probability a
given Facebook record can be matched to a specific voter record).
Therefore, for each state, Facebook estimated the match rate by
drawing 1000 records at random from their database, and
counting the number of matches with a list of the names and
birth dates that were available in the voter record. No individual
match was recorded: Only the aggregate match rate was stored,
and all other information was discarded.
In order to test the method, we simulated the matching
procedure using a set match rate that approximates what we
observed in the 13 states that we used to match voter data (30%).
We also set the turnout level to match each state in order to assess
the prediction error associated with a given number of draws. The
results of these simulations are summarized by Figure 2. The
simulations show that the less frequent behavior necessitates fewer
observations to classify individuals with a given level of confidence,
and that as the turnout moves away from 50%, more observations
(m2 ) are needed to reach the level of confidence of the less frequent
behavior.
It is important to note, once again, that the procedure only gives
us 1) estimates of the probability that any given Facebook user is
on the registration list and 2) estimates of his or her voting
behavior. We can not be certain whether a user is on the list, has
voted, or has abstained from these draws. In fact, it is possible that
a voter will be misclassified as an abstainer, or that an abstainer
will be misclassified as a voter. The number of draws is chosen
such that classifications of this type are unlikely, but still possible.
Using m1 and m2 we are able to predetermine the measurement
error level (in our case 95%) that appropriately balances the
capability of inference and the protection of privacy of users. In
other research applications, a higher or lower level of measurement error may be desired, which can easily be achieved by
adjusting m1 and m2 accordingly.

ð1Þ

Meanwhile, users who were registered to vote would be
somewhat more likely to have the correct classification (voter or
abstainer). Given that the user was on the registration list, their
presence in their own group in each draw skews the distribution of
their own draws (toward g for voters and toward 0 for abstainers).
Specifically, if a Facebook record does match a voter record,
then its own contribution to the total number of voters in the
group is always 1, and since the other g{1 group members are
randomly assigned, the probability that a draw is equal to y is


g{1 y{1
Pr(yij ~y)~
p (1{p)(g{y{1) :
y{1

ð2Þ

By the same reasoning, if a Facebook record matches an
abstainer record, then its own contribution to the total number of
voters in the group is always 0, and the probability that a draw is
equal to y is simply


g{1 y
Pr(yij ~y)~
p (1{p)(g{1{y) :
y

ð3Þ

Since these are independent draws, the probability of observing
the set of draws yi conditional on being unregistered, a voter, or an
abstainer is

m 
g
Pr(yi ji is unregistered)~ P
pyij (1{p)(g{yij )
j~1 yij

ð4Þ


m 
g{1
Pr(yi ji is a voter)~ P
pyij {1 (1{p)(g{yij {1)
j~1 yij {1

ð5Þ

Pseudocode
m



Pr(yi ji is an abstainer)~ P
j~1



g{1 y
p ij (1{p)(g{yij {1) :
yij

The following pseudocode summarizes the procedure. We also
provide R code that can be modified to implement the procedure
with any dataset. This code is available with the Supplementary
Material S1.
Pseudocode to process Origin Dataset.
SET seed
CALCULATE a vector of salts
SAVE vector of salts
READ origin dataset

ð6Þ

We can use these probabilities to classify individuals, assigning
each to the classification that maximizes the likelihood of
observing yi . For improved efficiency we transform the equations
to log likelihoods, and we use simulations to estimate the number
of values needed per record (m) to generate a specific classification
error. Simulation code (written in R) is provided in the Materials
and Methods section.

WHILE completed_observations , required_observations

N
N
N
N
N

Selecting the Number of m Iterations
For any application, we must select two values of m for each set
of records that we wish to match in order to balance the rate of
false voters and false abstainers. This is because the overall turnout
rate determines which behavior takes fewer observations to
distinguish from average behavior. If most people abstained, it
will take fewer observations to identify groups where users likely
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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CONCATENATE record IDs from origin dataset with
new salt
CALCULATE a hash for each concatenated record ID
CALCULATE modulus by dividing the hash value for
each record by the value N/g
SAVE modulus as the group ID
CALCULATE the total number of records per group ID
February 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 2 | e55760

Yahtzee: Anonymized Group Level Matching

N
N
N

Table 3 shows conditional probabilities generated from truth
tables for the Yahtzee classifier results. For each state, 1000
Facebook user records were chosen at random. Each was given a
classification based on the Yahtzee process. The truth tables
contained the frequency of each classification that was assigned to
each true behavior. This information was used to calculate the
classification accuracy in the categories of interest (voter or
abstainer), which are displayed for each state in Table 3. We also
calculated the 95% confidence interval for a null hypothesis that
the prediction is correct 95% of the time (based on an assumption
the successes are binomially distributed from the same number of
draws observed). Note that nearly all of the confidence intervals
contain the observed data, suggesting that deviations from 95%
accuracy are due to sampling variation.
Researchers interested in this procedure have the ability to
increase or decrease the accuracy of the group level matching
procedure by increasing or decreasing the number of observations
generated for each user. At the limit (extremely high values of m1
and/or m2 ) researchers have the ability to draw enough
observations that they are extremely confident about the true
behavior of users, but because of the group-level matching nature
of the procedure, they will never be 100% certain of an
individual’s behavior.
In addition to estimates of the voting behavior of individuals,
the procedure yields estimates of the probability that an individual
is on the voting record at all. As Table 3 shows, there is
approximately a 99% chance that when we do not find a match
for a user that there was not a match for that individual on the
state’s voting record. However, a user was ‘‘matched’’ only when
there was perfect concordance for first name, last name, and
birthdate. While we might be nearly certain that there was no
match for the user, the presence of nicknames, variation in
reported birth date, and other errors in the data mean that
unmatched users might actually be in the voter record. Thus, this
confidence level represents an upper bound of the probability that
a user is not in the record, given that we classified them as not
matched is probably lower than 99%. This means that interpretations of analyses based on the unmatched classification should be
careful to describe the process as measuring the match rate rather
than measuring the exact likelihood that a given user was in the
record. It also means that user privacy is more protected by
uncertainty since there is a greater chance that the user was
actually in the record when the procedure classifies him or her as
unmatched. Thus, this confidence level represents an upper bound
of the probability that a user is not in the record, given that we
classified them as not matched is probably lower than 99%.
Although it is possible that there are important systematic
differences between users with matchable and unmatchable
records, we tested for some such differences and found little
evidence to support this idea. Figure 3 shows that there is a good
fit between the turnout rate of matched Facebook users and the
overall turnout rate of each state. This positive relationship
suggests that the matching procedure is producing reliable
estimates of turnout for matched users at an aggregate level.
However, the relationship is not perfect for at least two reasons.
First, Facebook users within a given state are not necessarily a
representative sample of that state’s registered population. For
example, we know that the age distribution of Facebook users
skews toward younger people. Second, matched users are not
necessarily representative of all Facebook users, including those
who could not be matched. For example, people who use exotic
nicknames may have personality traits that also affect their
willingness to vote. Thus, while the good aggregate level fit is
suggestive, we should be cautious when describing our results to

CALCULATE the number of records who exhibit a
behavior per group ID
CALCULATE the behavioral frequency for all groups
that are of the specified group size (g = 5)
SAVE group ID and behavioral frequency
END WHILE
Pseudocode

to

Process

Destination

Dataset.

SET seed
READ destination dataset
READ vector of salts
READ group ID and behavioral frequency
WHILE completed_observations , required_observations

N
N
N
N
N

CONCATENATE record IDs from destination dataset
with new salt
CALCULATE a hash for each concatenated record ID
CALCULATE modulus by dividing the hash value for
each record by the value N/g
SAVE modulus as the group ID
MATCH behavioral frequency BY group ID

END WHILE
SET group level behavioral frequencies to individual records in
the destination dataset CALCULATE probability of behavior for
individual records using the group level frequencies

Results
Validation
Our process yielded 6,338,882 ‘‘matches’’ from the voter files to
Facebook’s data. This number reflects the fact that we obtained
about 1/3 of all voter records in the U.S., and of those, about 1/3
matched to the 61 million users who logged into Facebook on
Election Day. To validate the Yahtzee process, we compared its
classifications for a small set of randomly chosen records for each
state to the true voting behavior of those users. Table 2 contains
the m1 and m2 values for each state. These values were selected by
adjusting the m1 and m2 values in the simulation code in the
Appendix until values yielding approximately 95% accuracy were
found. That is, we decided that for our research purposes, it was
appropriate to obtain 95% accuracy in estimating the likelihood
that a particular individual in fact turned out to vote. Using the
simulation code provided in the Appendix, we first adjusted m1
such that the algorithm would estimate with 95% accuracy the
more common behavior in a particular state (either turning out to
vote or abstaining). Given the m1 value, we then adjusted m2 such
that the less common behavior was also estimated with 95%
accuracy.
While implementing the algorithm on real data can be time
consuming, determining the number of draws necessary to achieve
a given level of accuracy is not. As seen in Table 2, the values for
m1 and m2 vary considerably. The variation in m1 is due to
variation in the turnout rate and variation in the match rate. A
lower match rate requires more draws overall in order to
distinguish those on the registration list from those not on the
registration list. Variation in m2 is primarily due to variation in the
turnout rate in the states. States that have a turnout rate near 50%
(such as Florida and Kansas) take few extra observations to
distinguish the less common behavior from those who are assigned
values at random, while states with a turnout rate far from 50%
(such as Arkansas and New Jersey) require many extra draws to
make such distinctions.
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Table 2. Number of Draws.

Table 3. Number of Draws.

State

m1

m2

Common Type

Arkansas

55

45

Voters

California

50

50

Voters

Connecticut

65

10

Voters

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.988

Florida

75

0

Abstainers

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.932

[0.912, 0.980]

Kansas

75

0

Abstainers

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.951

[0.919, 0.978]

Kentucky

60

5

Voters

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.987

Missouri

70

20

Abstainers

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.888

[0.916, 0.978]

New Jersey

60

65

Abstainers

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.988

[0.912, 0.981]

Nevada

65

25

Voters

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.994

New York

55

50

Abstainers

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.937

[0.914, 0.977]

Oklahoma

65

15

Abstainers

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.970

[0.917, 0.982]

Pennsylvania

65

15

Voters

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.998

Rhode Island

75

5

Abstainers

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.928

[0.915, 0.980]

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.953

[0.918, 0.982]

State

Arkansas

California

Connecticut

Florida

Kansas

m1 is the number of draws necessary to reach the desired level of accuracy for
the more frequent behavioral type and m2 is the number of additional draws
necessary to reach the desired level of accuracy for the less frequent behavioral
type.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055760.t002

Kentucky

explain the limitations of out-of-sample inferences that might be
made using the matched data.
About one in three Facebook users were successfully matched to
their state’s voter records using the Yahtzee process. Although the
match rate for this study is lower than the match rates in other
studies that match individuals to public voting records (which
typically atain match rates about 50%), this may be due to the
demographic composition of Facebook. In Figure 4 we show how
the probability of matching varies by age. There is a positive
relationship between age and the probability of matching the
voting record through approximately age 80 (as seen by the
positive slope of the triangles). While there is a drop off in the
probability of obtaining matches for users over the age of 80, it is
important to note that there are very few Facebook users in this
age group (as seen by the left skew of the diamonds). Younger users
are also more difficult to match, likely because fewer of them are
registered, and even those who are registered may be accessing
Facebook from an out-of-state college. Older Facebook users are
easier to match, but there are fewer of them.
Because we know that the matched sample is not representative
of the overall population by age, we assessed the turnout rate of the
matched Facebook user sample as it compared to the turnout rate of
each state by age. Figure 5 shows that the turnout rate goes up
among older users and declines with advanced age in both the
matched sample and the voter records for each state. These results
suggest that the matching procedure correctly identifies voters and
abstainers and that once we control for the skew in the age
distribution of the matched sample, the voting behavior of Facebook
users is not very different from that of the population overall.

Missouri

New Jersey

New York

Nevada

Oklahoma

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

95% CI

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.949

[0.908, 0.990]

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.957

[0.913, 0.981]

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.996

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.907

[0.921, 0.978]

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.974

[0.921, 0.978]

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.993

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.979

[0.915, 0.986]

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.947

[0.904, 0.982]

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.999

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.945

[0.908, 0.991]

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

1.000

[0.895, 0.987]

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.999

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.970

[0.917, 0.982]

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.947

[0.908, 0.985]

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.987

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.941

[0.911, 0.985]

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.963

[0.915, 0.982]

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.996

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.950

[0.914, 0.986]

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.940

[0.920, 0.980]

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.998

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.975

[0.912, 0.981]

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.971

[0.914, 0.986]

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.994

Pr(AbsjClass = Abs)

0.972

[0.908, 0.979]

Pr(VotjClass = Vot)

0.953

[0.912, 0.980]

Pr(NMjClass = NM)

0.997

Yahtzee classifier results from 1000 randomly selected Facebook users from
each state. Each user was given a classification based on the Yahtzee process:
‘‘Abs’’ ~ Abstainer, ‘‘Vot’’ ~ Voter, ‘‘NM’’ ~ Not Matched. The conditional
probabilities are calculated as the probability of observing a true behavior
conditional on the Yahtzee classification. The 95% confidence intervals are for
the null distribution of 95% accuracy in the classification, calculated from a
binomial distribution with the same number of draws in each category. In total,
22 of the 26 tests fall within these intervals, suggesting that deviations from
95% accuracy are due to sampling variation, and for a large sample the
procedure will generate the desired level of accuracy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055760.t003

Friends and Voting
The Yahtzee procedure allowed us to combine several distinct
public voting records with Facebook data while maintaining the
anonymity of the users. An important question in the literature on
voting, which we can now address with this data, is the extent to
which voting behavior is correlated between socially-connected
individuals [12]. Scholars have long known that turnout is strongly
correlated between friends, family members and coworkers, even
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org
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when controlling for socioeconomic status and selection effects [13–
24]. Some of this correlation may result from the tendency to choose
friends with a similar tendency to be engaged in politics (‘‘homo8
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phily’’), and some of it may result from a tendency for sociallyconnected individuals to affect each other’s political behavior
(‘‘influence’’), but both are important phenomena and establishing
a correlation is the first step in determining whether either exists [25].
The Facebook data is particularly appealing for addressing
correlated behavior because it also allows us to measure the strength
of the social connection between two users. We expect that
correlation in voting among closer friends should be higher
because of several mechanisms or combinations of them. As
mentioned above, people choose friends, and in particular close
friends, based on similarity in attributes (‘‘homophily’’). If
individuals are selecting friends based on a shared interest in
politics or civic activism then they are more likely to both vote
because of the shared interest. Closer friends are also more likely
to ‘‘influence’’ each others’ behavior [11]. A friend might observe
the other friend voting and then vote herself, especially if they
carpool or work together. Also, one friend could discuss an
upcoming election with another friend and convince or remind
her to vote. Finally, closer friends are more likely to be physically
proximate [26], and thus be more likely to both be exposed to the
same environmental factors. For instance, close friends may be
more likely to live in the same competitive district or both be
exposed to the same ‘‘get out the vote’’ drive. There are many
possible scenarios that could lead to a correlation between
friendship strength and voting behavior.
In order to determine friendship strength of the users in our
sample, we followed the recommendations of [27] and created a
measure based on the interactions between two users. Interactions
include actions on Facebook that could be directed from one user
to another and include: comment, like, message, poke, wall post, tag or
chat. As described in [11], we categorized all friendships in our
sample by decile, ranking them from lowest to highest percent of
interactions. Each decile is a separate sample of friendship dyads.
For example, decile 1 contains all friends at the 0th percentile of
interaction to the 10th percentile while decile 2 contains all friends

at the 11th percentile of interaction to the 20th, and so on. We
validated this measure of tie strength with a survey [11,27]. In this
survey we asked Facebook users to identify their closest friends.
Subjects were randomly asked to identify either 1, 3, 5, or 10
friends We then measured the percentile of interaction between
friends in the same way and predicted survey response based on
interaction. The results show that as the decile of interaction
increases, the probability that a friendship is with the user’s closest
friend increases. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that
the closer a social tie between two people, the more frequently they
will interact, regardless of medium. In this case, frequency of
Facebook interaction is a good predictor of being named a close
friend. Moreover, previous research suggests that higher levels of
interaction on Facebook indicate that such friends are more likely
to be physically proximate and suggest a higher level of
commitment to the friendship, more positive affect between the
friends, and a desire for the friendship to be socially recognized
[26].
With the matched data and a measure of friendship strength we
now have the information necessary to test the relationship
between friendship strength and voting behavior with the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis. Similarity in voting behavior between sociallyconnected individuals increases as the strength of their relationship
increases.
To test this hypothesis we used the validated decile measure of
tie strength and then calculated the correlation between user and
friend’s validated voting behavior for all of the friendship dyads
(see Figure 6). The correlation in friends’ validated voting behavior
increases as tie strength increases, suggesting that closer friends
have more similar voting behavior than more distant friends.
However, we want to determine if the correlations we observe
are different from what we would expect due to chance. Standard
techniques assume independence of observations, which is not the
case here due to the complex interdependencies in the network.

Figure 3. The proportion of matched users who turned out to
vote compared to the overall turnout rate by state. Note that the
abbreviation for Kansas is repositioned slightly so that it does not
overlap with the abbreviation for Florida. The results show that the
Yahtzee procedure produces about the same overall turnout rate for
each state as that shown in the official voter record.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055760.g003

Figure 4. The proportion of Facebook users that were matched
to the validated voting record by age and each age group’s
proportion of the largest age group (those 20 years of age at
the time of the election). This figure helps to explain why match
rates are lower for Facebook users who tend to be younger and more
difficult to match than the average registered voter.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055760.g004

PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

9

February 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 2 | e55760

Yahtzee: Anonymized Group Level Matching

these are essential for researchers who are interested in making
inferences that draw upon data about individuals, while also
respecting the privacy of individuals (and the privacy policies of
entities that collect such data). Many extraordinary research
projects could be enhanced by joining their data with other
sources of individual information. For example, one project
collected 509 million Twitter messages from 2.4 million individuals
from 84 countries between February 2008 and January 2010 [28].
Other studies include an analysis of the mood within America as a
function of date and time using 300 million Twitter messages
generated between September 2006 and August 2009 [29], an
analysis of 50 million Google search queries to identify the weekly
influenza level in regions of the United States [30], and an analysis
of the application adoption patterns of 50 million Facebook users
[31]. In each of these studies, however, a variety of additional
questions could be addressed if more information about the users
generating the observed data could be obtained. This information
often exists in other datasets, yet linking these datasets raises both
technical and ethical concerns.
We used the Yahtzee method to match public voting records to
Facebook user data. Though our application focuses on voting
behavior, other respondent behaviors and outcomes — such as
data found in medical reports or consumer records — could be
matched to other data sources using the Yahtzee method as well.
Our voting behavior application allowed us to test the Yahtzee
method on real world data, where we found that it generates the
same level of uncertainty about individual records that was
predicted by theory. Additionally, we found that the turnout rate

Figure 5. The proportion of matched users who turned out to
vote by age. The dark line represents the turnout rate by age of the
matched sample of Facebook users. Each gray line represents the
turnout rate by age of a state voter record. The results show that users
on Facebook exhibit the same pattern of turnout with respect to age as
the populations of each state.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055760.g005

To take the network into account, we compare the observed
correlation to a randomly-generated value when we keep the
network topology fixed but randomly permute the voting behavior
of friends and once again measure the correlation. We repeat this
procedure 1,000 times to generate a theoretical null distribution
for the correlation we would expect due to chance. We obtain
confidence intervals for the null distribution by sorting the results
and taking the appropriate percentiles (in our case, we are
interested in the 95% confidence interval, so we use the 25th and
975th values). These low and high values are displayed in Table 4.
The results show that all of the observed correlations are well
outside of the 95% confidence intervals of the null distributions.
The narrow range of variation in the null distribution also suggests
that the behavior of the closest friends is significantly more
correlated than average.
The Yahtzee procedure has allowed us to repeatedly match
small groups of anonymous individuals between datasets without
ever sharing individual level information between the datasets.
The method allowed us to ensure the anonymity of the user by
adding uncertainty about each individual’s behavior in the dataset.
The method is conceptually similar but procedurally distinct from
other techniques designed to ensure respondent anonymity at the
time of data collection [4–7]. We have demonstrated that the
method performs as predicted by theoretical analysis by applying it
to data from Facebook and public voter records. The procedure
allowed us to demonstrate that individual-level users’ validated
voting behavior is correlated with the behavior of the user’s closest
friends. This inference was made using data from two distinct
sources that were never combined at the individual level.

Figure 6. The correlation between friends’ validated voting
behavior based on the proportion of interaction between the
dyad in the three months prior to the election. We categorized all
friendships in our sample by decile, ranking them from lowest to
highest percent of interactions. Each decile is a separate sample of
friendship dyads. For example, decile 1 contains all friends at the 0th
percentile of interaction to the 10th percentile while decile 2 contains
all friends at the 11th percentile of interaction to the 20th, and so on.
Interactions include actions on Facebook that could be directed from
one user to another and include: comment, like, message, poke, wall
post, tag or chat. These correlations exist well outside of simulated null
distributions. 95% confidence intervals are displayed in Table 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055760.g006

Discussion
Here we have introduced a method of group-level matching
that allows researchers to merge two data sources while respecting
the privacy of individuals in the constituent data sets. Methods like
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who rely on Internet websites such as Facebook or Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk in order to recruit subjects. Finally, we showed
that using this data we are able to study the correlation in voting
behavior between friends, finding that the correlation in behavior
becomes tighter as friendships become closer.
We live in an age in which more and more data are being
collected about individuals, providing researchers with the
opportunities to study phenomena at a scale never before possible
and to study new relationships that were previously infeasible to
measure due to the difficulty of collecting information from diverse
sources about the same individuals. While the availability of this
data offers exciting opportunities for new avenues of research,
much of it is held by corporations that have an interest in
maintaining the privacy of their users or customers. In order for
researchers to conduct studies using this data, new methods will
need to be invented that fit specific problems with the data. In this
paper, we offer one solution to what we believe is a common
problem that corporations and researchers often face: the need to
ethically and respectfully match sensitive individual-level data to
additional sources of information.

Table 4. Correlation.

Decile

Correlation

n

Null low

Null high

1

0.156366

6703469

20.000960

0.000976

2

0.156163

7750717

20.000905

0.000815

3

0.156499

8253044

20.000812

0.000840

4

0.156321

8552987

20.000766

0.000832

5

0.157428

8882969

20.000750

0.000809

6

0.158828

8847712

20.000815

0.000793

7

0.161030

9041679

20.000794

0.000709

8

0.163359

9407243

20.000736

0.000755

9

0.169258

9356494

20.000788

0.000762

10

0.190253

9122388

20.000761

0.000785

The estimated correlation between a user’s validated turnout and the validated
turnout of her friends by decile of user friend interactions. See Figure 5 for a
visualization of this relationship. To compare the observed values to what is
possible due to chance, we keep the network topology fixed and then
randomly permute the voting behavior of friends. We repeat this procedure
1,000 times and measure the correlation. The simulated correlation values
generate a theoretical null distribution for the correlation which we would
expect due to chance. The Null low and Null high columns display the 95%
confidence interval of this null distribution. Note that the observed correlations
exist well outside the null distributions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055760.t004

Supporting Information
Supplementary Material S1 R program that can be modified
to implement the procedure with any dataset. R program that
estimates the number of values needed per record to generate a
specific classification error.
(ZIP)

of Facebook users by state strongly correlates with the overall
turnout rate of all individuals in the state and Facebook users
within each age group tend to vote at about the same rate as
members of those age groups in the population as a whole. These
results not only suggest that the Yahtzee method works as
expected, but also that Facebook users are very similar to the
population as a whole in terms of their voting behavior. This
should be an encouraging result for a growing group of researchers
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